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Several countries in all parts of the world are undergoing a process of inte-
gration, several others are experiencing strong pressures towards increasing
decentralization. At the same time, many of these countries are struggling to
control the expansion of redistributive expenditures and their distortionary
effects on the allocation of resources. Therefore, a fundamental question in
all these countries is what is the allocation of tasks to different levels of gov-
ernments that best controls social expenditure and minimizes distortions.
Because these processes occur within or between economies with high cap-
ital mobility, a second crucial question is therefore what are the effects of
capital mobility on the budget size and productive efficiency under different
fiscal policy arrangements.
This paper develops a two-country model where redistribution is deter-
mined endogenously through a voting process, and argues that a decentral-
ized regime is likely to minimize the distortionary effects of redistribution.
Surprisingly, capital mobility exacerbates the inefficiency of the centralized
regime. First, capital mobility increases the distortionary effects of redistri-
bution in the economy; second, once the choice of the regime too is endo-
genized, it causes a majority of individuals in both countries to choose the
more inefficient regime.
The paper also highlights the importance of considering specific insti-
tutional aspects of redistribution, the tax system and labor markets. An
important message of the model is that a process of fiscal integration may
lead to "bad" outcomes when it involves countries with very different insti-
tutional characteristics.
This research was supported by NSF grant No. SBR-9414719. I thank Alberto Alesina,
Alberto Giovannini, Gustavo Piga and seminar participants at Boston College, Columbia
University, Harvard University, IGIER in Milan, MIT and New York University for
helpful comments.
1 Introduction.
In virtually all industrialized countries, the two crucial macroeconomic problems of
fiscal policy are the explosive expansion of social programs, both in absolute terms and
in relation to other types of government expenditure (see Table 1), and their perceived
distortionary effects on the allocation of factors (see the recent OECD Job Study (1994)).








All figures are in shares of GDP. Sources: EUROSTAT (social expenditure) and
OECD (government consumption). Countries included in the sample: Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, UK. Social expenditure includes the following types of benefits:
sickness; invalidity/disability; employment injury; old age; survivors; maternity;
family; unemployment; vocational training; housing.
A fundamental question in all these countries is therefore what is the allocation of
tasks to different levels of governments that best achieves control over social expen-
diture and minimizes distortions. This question clearly need to be analysed in the
context of highly integrated economies, where high capital mobility potentially limits
the scope for independent fiscal policies in smaller units. A second crucial question in
these processes of fiscal integration and decentralization is therefore what are the effects
of capital mobility on the budget size and productive efficiency under different fiscal
policy arrangements. This paper studies these two questions in the context of a posi-
tive model where fiscal policy is determined by aggregating the preferences of diverse,
self-interested individuals.
The public finance tradition has focused mainly on the study of the social optimality
1
of different degrees of decentralization of the financing and provision of public goods. In
general, the conclusion is that decentralized arrangements induce a suboptimal provision
of public goods because lower levels of governments fail to internalize the effects of the
public goods they provide and because of taxpayers mobility. As shown in Table 1,
however, the focus on the provision of public goods does not seem justified any more, as
redistribution takes up the largest share of the government budget virtually everywhere
in the industrialized world.
Even when it has dealt specifically with redistribution, the public finance tradition
in fiscal federalism has approached the problem as one of public goods with different
spatial coverage. 1 Redistribution has a public good dimension because taxpayers care
about the welfare of low-income individuals. As argued first by Stogler (1957), if the
financing of redistribution is decentralized, a standard free-rider problem implies that
there will be too little redistribution in a voting equilibrium. This conclusion holds
even when taxpayers care only about the welfare of the poor geographically close to
them, as in Pauli (1973) and Brown and Oates (1987), provided the poor and/or the
taxpayers are mobile. The reason is that ecah sub-central government will try to export
the costs of redistribution by setting lower taxes and transfers than its neighboring sub-
central governments, thereby inducing outmigration of the poor and immigration of the
rich. More generally, the existence of all sorts of spillover effects implies that both the
financing and the provision of redistribution is best carried out at the central level. 2
Thus, with few exceptions, the dominant view in this tradition is clearly in favor of a
system of centralized redistribution. 3
The public finance tradition provides an important theoretical benchmark for the
analysis of fiscal policy in multi-layered governments. To answer the two macroeco-
nomic questions posed at the beginning, however, it is necessary to incorporate some
fundamental realistic features of social expenditure programs in the analysis. This re-
quires a departure from the traditional framework in at least three directions.
title of the seminal application by Orr (1976) best exemplifies this approach.
2See Oates (1972) for a useful exposition of the main arguments for and against centralization, and
Inman and Rubinfeld (1992) for a brief survey of more recent issues.
3Johnson (1988) and (1990) provides such an exception. Because redistribution decreases the local
per capita income via its effects on labor supply, it also decreases the amount of federal taxes paid by
local residents. It might then be less costly to local residents to finance redistribution at the local level
if the other localities do not follow the same strategy, because the net transfers from the federal govern-
ment increase. As a consequence, local financing might lead to more, rather than less, redistribution.
However, the difference between the two systems disappears in a symmetric Nash equilibrium where
all localities try to decrease their federal taxes by increasing local redistribution, because in this case
the net federal transfers remain zero. Finally, if labor is sufficiently mobile across localities, the usual
problem of underprovision of redistribution caused by the outmigration of the rich and the immigration
of the poor will arise.
First, one must model explicitly the diverging interests behind redistributive fiscal
policy. In the traditional public finance approach, redistribution is the result of an altru-
istic motive. Yet, it is hard to believe that the existing problems with social programs
have been caused by an excess of altruism on the part of the average taxpayer. In this
paper, I endogenize fiscal policy by studying a majority voting process among groups
with constrasting interests regarding expenditure and taxation. This assumption is ob-
viously only a crude approximation to the actual determination of fiscal policy in the
real world. Other ways to endogenize fiscal policy, such as pressure groups or bargaining,
could also be considered. 4
Second, there must be room for the distortionary effects of redistribution on the
allocation of resources. In particular, one must recognize that redistributive programs
interact extensively with the functioning of labor markets. On one hand, it is the
structure of labor markets that determines how many recipients there will be for a given
program: for instance, once the government has set the level of the benefit, it is the labor
market that determines how many workers will apply for an unemployment benefit, and
therefore the final expenditure on that program. On the other hand, these programs have
important effects on the working of labor markets: an unemployment benefit program
obviously distorts the allocation of resources both because it subsidizes unemployment,
and because of the distortionary taxes needed to finance it.
Third, rather than treating social programs as just different types of public goods,
one must consider the specific administrative elements that characterize these programs.
Two elements are particularly important: (i) social programs are open-ended: the gov-
ernment fixes the eligibility criteria and the amounts of the benefits, but the total expen-
diture is determined by the response of the economy; (ii) even when they are funded at
the central level, their administration is necessarily sub-central. This gives sub-central
governments (or sub-central branches of the agency that administers the program) con-
siderable discretion in determining the number of beneficiaries and, ultimately, the total
expenditure on a certain program. For instance, a sub-central government may be more
or less generous in setting that part of the benefit level that is left to its autonomy;
more or less rigorous in applying eligibility criteria; more or less elastic in assessing the
disability and sickness claims; and more or less supportive of the claimant's position in
appeal decisions.
The next section discusses extensively the empirical relevance and quantitative im-
portance of the three characteristics of social expenditure underlined so far: their clien-
teles, their interactions with the working of labor markets, and especially their specific
4Epple and Romer (1991) also emphasize the importance of endogenizing redistributive decisions in
subnational fiscal policy by explicitly considering a voting process.
administrative characteristics. Here, I develop a first intuition of how they provide a
framework for the analysis of the two macroeconomic questions posed at the begin-
ning, namely the efficiency of alternative degrees of decentralization of the financing of
redistribution and the role of capital mobility.
In all the discussion so far, a sub-central level could be interpreted as a region within
a country or as a country within a federation or union. Accordingly, the central level
would be the country under the first interpretation and the union under the second. As
documeneted in the next section, differences in collective attitudes towards redistribu-
tion and in administrative standard can be large among states within the U.S. and even
between counties within individual states. A fortiori, then, one would expect these dif-
ferences to be large and important between countries joining a union. In fact, different
national preferences towards social security5 are at the forefront of the policy debate on
European integration. 6 To the extent that these administrative and political differences
reflect differences in political systems and institutions, they cannot realistically be elim-
inated in the short or medium run; therefore, they will be reflected in the administration
of social security within a fiscal union. Hence, from now on I will cast the discussion in
terms of countries within a union.
The answer the model provides to the first question - namely, what allocation of
responsibilities best controls the size of the budget and minimizes distortions - is that
decentralized financing minimizes distortions because it limits the fiscal resources avail-
able to subsidize voluntary unemployment. The answer to the second question - what is
the role of capital mobility - is that, contrary to a common argument, capital mobility
does not provide a cure to the distortions inherent in centralized redistribution, rather,
it exacerbates them.
The main intuition for these results is as follows. A centralized fiscal policy might
allow a country in a federation with a more generous attitude towards redistribution
to draw tax revenues from other countries with more rigorous standards. This might
provide the first country with the resources for an expansion of its redistributive pro-
grams, with all their distortionary effects. By contrast, in a decentralized fiscal system
each country has to rely on its own tax revenues to finance the resulting unemploy-
ment. Thus, little or no unemployment will be subsidized in equilibrium and little or no
5In what follows, the expression "social security" refers to all programs that redistribute income
across individuals with different incomes. In particular, it also includes welfare programs (see the
legend of Table 1 for a list of the programs included in the definition).
6For instance, according to the polls, concerns on the destiny of the national social security systems
in an integrated Europe were a major source of strength for the forces opposing European Union
membership in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, and were the single most important cause of the rejection
of the membership in the first Danish referendum.
distortions will result.
Furthermore, capital mobility exacerbates the inefficiency of the centralized regime.
When capital is mobile, if voters in one country raise the tax rate to subsidize unemploy-
ment, they cause an outflow of capital both because employment decreases and because
taxation of capital increases relative to the other country. In a centralized system where
the tax rate is by definition the same in both countries only the first effect is present, so
that the marginal cost of increasing taxes is always lower in this regime. In fact, a first
important result of this paper is that in a centralized regime unemployment is higher
when capital is mobile.
Given the inefficiency of the centralized regime in the presence of differences in ad-
ministrative standards between countries, one would think that a majority of voters in
at least one country (the one that is losing tax revenues on net) would refuse to be
part of this arrangement. However, when capital is mobile, a majority of agents in both
countries will be in favor of a centralized regime. Even in the country that is losing tax
revenues, a majority of agents are actually better off in the centralized regime, essen-
tially because their country is receiving the capital that is flowing out of the distorted
economy. Hence, and contrary to a plausible intuitive argument, capital mobility has
a perverse effect here: it exacerbates the inefficiencies of the centralized regime, and it
causes a majority of voters in both countries to accept the more inefficient regime.
Thus, an explicit consideration of more realistic features of social programs, of their
political process and of the economic environment leads one to question the widespread
preference for centralized redistribution coupled with capital mobility. A more general
conclusion of this paper (which it shares with other recent contributions, like Alesina
and Perotti (1994) and Alesina and Spolaore (1994)) is that, when countries have large
institutional and/or political differences, they might be better off going their own ways
rather than integrating.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses more in detail the specific
elements of social expenditure emphasized in the introduction. Section 3 presents the
model and discusses its assumptions. Sections 4 and 5 solve the model for the cases of
immobile and mobile capital, respectively. Section 6 endogenizes the choice of the fiscal
regime. Section 7 concludes by discussing some possible extensions of the model and its
relationship with some recent literature.
2 Administration and politics in social programs.
Before addressing the formal analysis, it is important to understand the empirical rel-
evance of the characteristics of social programs that were highlighted in the previous
section, in particular: (i) social programs are open-ended and (u) their administration
is necessarily decentralized. To do so, it is useful to consider first the U.S. case.
These characteristics are certainly of major importance in those programs, like AFDC
and Food Stamps, that are funded at least in part at the federal level but are largely
administered by the states, including the setting of eligibility criteria. In 1970, during
the hearings on the reform for AFDC, Repr. John W. Byrnes told the Rules Committee:
"The present system is completely open ended.. The Congress and the Federal Govern-
ment are at the mercy of the States." (quoted in Derthick (1990), p. 88). Furthermore,
because the administration of these programs is essentially local, even within individual
states different administrative efforts among counties imply large inter-county differences
in total expenditure per capita. Stine (1988) has documented large differences in the
annual welfare administrative expenditure per AFDC case among 57 counties in New
York state. In 1980, the range was $91.67 to $549.62. Moreover, administrative effort
is highly correlated with a measure of redistributive effort, the percentage of families
below the poverty line that receive AFDC benefits. In 1980, this percentage ranged for
22.3% to 96.0% in the 57 counties of the study.
The disability pension program is a second example. This program is less decentral-
ized than the Food Stamps and AFDC programs: although the actual administration of
the program is obviously local, now the standards and eligibility criteria are set by the
Social Security Administration and are valid for all the states. Yet, its recent history
provides a very clear illustration of the factors that are emphasized in tis paper. During
the 70's, the growth of expenditure in the social security disability program was double
that of receipts; in 1977, this situation resulted in a "funding crisis" that prompted the
Social Security Administration to call for a tightening of the eligibility and adjudication
criteria by the state bureaucracies. As documented by Parsons (1991), under political
pressure from the federal goverment initially most states responded positively: this was
reflected in a drastic increase in the denial rate for disability applications, from 55% in
1977 to 68% in 1980. However, as several states refused to cooperate because of inter-
nal political pressure, this increase in the average denial rate was accompanied by an
impressive increase in the inter-state variance in denial rates: for instance, in New York
state it rose from 47.3% in 1977 to 72.3% in 1978, while in Colorado, Virginia and a few
other states it actually fell over the same period. Moreover, the average increase in the
denial rate was accompanied by a fall in the application rates: Parsons estimates that a
percentage increase in the former leads, after two years, to a fall in the latter by .4%. As
a consequence of these administrative interventions, the 1977 funding crisis was averted.
Thus, this episode illustrates vividly a series of features of social programs that tend to
be overlooked in most macroeconomic analyses: (i) the role of political factors; (ii) the
importance of the administration of the programs in determining their sizes; (m) the
independent role of sub-central governments and administrative agencies; (iv) the high
variance in the responses of sub-central governments and administrative agencies.
The brief discussion of the U.S. case suggests that these features are relevant for all
those social programs whose membership implies some element of discretionality on the
part of the administration and/or some scope for abuse on the part of applicants: in
practice, all social expenditure programs except old-age pensions. Of course, the actual
relevance of these issues will vary, depending on the extent of political involvement in
the managing of social expenditure, of bureacratic inefficiency, or downright corruption.
But the crucial point is that these issues are of major macroeconomic significance, be-
cause they apply to the majority of social programs, which in turn constitute the main
single item of practically all government budgets in contemporary inustrialized coun-
tries. For instance, in some countries, like Italy, Netherlands and Portugal, expenditure
on disability pensions alone is comparable to (and in the case of Italy until a few years
ago, higher than) expenditure on old-age pensions.
There can be several patterns and motivations for the different attitudes of sub-
central governments concerning social expenditure policies. In some cases a generous
administration of a social security program is simply a way to build consensus around
sub-central governments. For instance, in Italy the average ratio of invalidity and dis-
ability pensions to old-age pensions in the whole country in 1991 was 91.2%; however,
the same ratio was 47.6% in the North, 210.7% in the South and 301.4% in the region of
Sardinia. 7 Clearly, these differences have nothing to do with demographics; rather, this
pattern is the result of the working of political patronage at the local level, especially
in depressed areas. For instance, the appeal decisions for disability claims in Italy are
examined by local committees, whose membership is mainly composed of representa-
tives of labor unions and other professional organizations, all of them appointed by and
linked to the local government. Perhaps not surprisingly, the great majority of disability
pensions have been awarded after one or more appeals (see Ferrero (1984)).
In other cases, the expansion of certain programs at the local level might reflect
cyclical or structural conditions in the labor market. In the study cited above, Stine
found that administrative effort in a county increases when the county's unemployment
rate increases. The high incidence of disability pensions in Holland (50% of old age
pensions in 1990) is the result of an intentional relaxation of eligibility criteria to support
long-term unemployment, tolerated and even encouraged by the central government (see
Haan, Sterks and de Kam (1993) and Emerson (1988)). These features are often even
7According to Yates (1986), the same ratio was 669% in the Enna province in Sicily in 1977!
institutionalized: during the 80's, in Holland and Italy the local labor market conditions
were recognized by the law as legitimate determinants in assessing eligibility for disability
benefits.
In other cases still, the expansion of social expenditure at the local level may be the
result of simple collusion or downright corruption. In less extreme situations, differences
between localities might simply reflect different preferences of local governments.
The main implication of all these cases is that it is of fundamental importance to
distinguish between the administration of social programs, that for technical reasons is
necessarily decentralized, and the funding of redistributive programs, which for historical
reasons tends to be centralized, but need not be so.
3 The model.
A. Assumptions.
1. Technology and factor endowments. There are two countries, A and B. Each coun-
try produces a single good with a Cobb-Douglas technology using labor, Z, and capital,
K: y = LaK1~a. 8 In each country there are three classes of agents: a total mass L of
workers, each endowed with one indivisible unit of labor; a total mass LK of holders of
capital ("capitalists" hereafter), each endowed with K/LK units of capital; and a total
mass LR of unproductive agents. The only source of income of this last class is therefore
fiscal redistribution. One can think of members of this class as retirees, in which case
their income would be an old-age pension. Alternatively, one could assume that there
are L + LR individuals with labor endowment, who face an idiosyncratic risk of losing
their endowment with probability LR/(LR-\-L); in this case, the income of an individual
hit by a negative shock would be a disability pension. The common feature to these
interpretations is that these agents' only interest is in maximizing redistribution. Only
for brevity's sake I will refer to this class as "retirees".
These three classes represent in a compact way the spectrum of interests in the fiscal
system: capitalists earn factor income and always dislike taxes, workers earn factor
income and support taxes under some circumstances, and retirees have no factor income
and support as much taxation and redistribution as possible. To avoid trivial voting
equilibria, I assume that each of the three classes of agents has by itself less than 50%
8Because the number of factors exceeds the number of goods, the factor price equalization theorem
does not hold. However, since the two countries have identical technologies and factor endowments, the
wage and the return to capital would be equalized if the structures of the labor markets were the same.
of the total votes.
2. Fiscal policy. Fiscal policy consists of a redistributive program that provides a
pension s to retirees and is financed by a proportional tax rate on capital income. The
size of s is endogenous, and determined by majority voting as specified below. The
budget is always balanced. To insure an internal solution to the voters' problem, I
assume that there are convex costs of redistributing taxes, so that when the tax rate
is t and the tax base is X, a fraction t of total tax revenues is wasted, and only the
amount (t — t2)X can be redistributed. Effectively, this assumption imposes an upper
bound on the tax rate that will be enacted in equilibrium, because for a given tax base
tax revenues are maximized at t = | .
Fiscal policy can be decentralized or centralized. In the first case each country
chooses its own tax rate by majority voting, and all redistribution is financed using the
revenues raised in that country only. In the second case a common tax rate is chosen
by majority voting by all the citizens of the two countries, and revenues are shared to
finance all redistribution in the two countries.
In this paper, I limit the analysis to a comparison of the two regimes in terms of
their outcomes, especially their productive efficiency. Hence, I do not explicitly model
many of the reasons why two countries might want to centralize their fiscal policies, like
mutual insurance, economies of scale in the provision of public goods, etc. These aspects
are well understood, and have recently been dealt with elsewhere (see e.g. Persson and
Tabellini (1992), Alesina and Spolaore (1994), Alesina and Perotti (1994)).
3. The administration of fiscal policy. As discussed at length in the previous section,
even when social security is funded with tax revenues collected at the central level, in
general sub-central governments (and, a fortiori, countries within a federation) have
considerable discretion in its administration, and therefore considerable leverage on the
final expenditure. 9 To study the two macroeconomic questions posed at the beginning
of Section 1 in a manageable way, I formalize this feature of social expenditure as follows.
In country A the administration of the redistributive program is more generous, so that
workers who apply can receive a pension s with probability p > 0. Only for simplicity,
and without loss of generality, from now on I will assume that p = 1. By contrast, in B
workers do not have access to the pension.
9For the purposes of this model, it is irrelevant whether it is the local government or the local branch
of a federal agency that administer the program at the local level. Once again, the literature is fairly
unanimous on this point: local governments should participate in the administration of redistributive
programs funded at the federal level, particularly means-tested ones, because they possess informational
and other administrative advantages over the central government (see for instance Ladd and Doolittle
(1982) and ISSA (1987)). As a matter of fact, in the U.S. about 70% of expenditures connected to
welfare programs is administered by local governments.
Thus, this formalization takes as given differences among sub-central governments in
their position about social expenditure. The discussion of section 2 illustrates the main
reasons for these differences, and undoubtedly there are more. However, because here
I focus on the macroeconomic consequences of these differences, I do not model them
explicitly.
4. Labor markets. In this model fiscal policy affects the equilibrium of the economy
through its effects on labor supply and the allocation of capital (when capital is mobile).
Fiscal policy has effects on the supply of labor because labor markets are unionized: in
each country, all workers are organized in a monopoly union that takes the tax rate t and
the subsidy s as given and sets the wage w (or equivalently, the level of employment L)
to maximize the expected income of its members, subject to the labor demand function:
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w = aLa-lKl-a (2)
where D is a dummy variable denoting country A. n Thus, this expression reflects the
fact that, due to the different stance of the fiscal authorities or administration, only
in country A can a worker who decides not to work receive the subsidy 5. Note that,
implicitly, the utility of leisure has been normalized to 0 without loss of generality. The
r.h.s. of (1) represents the expected income of a worker: with probability L/L he will
be employed and will receive the wage w, while with probability {L — L)/L he will be
unemployed and will receive an income 5 if he is in country A.
Thus, when a subsidy is available to unemployed workers, the reservation wage for
union members increases and this is reflected in a higher wage demanded by the union
and lower employment. Note that the presence of monopoly power in labor markets is
essential: if the individual labor supply were elastic but the labor market were compet-
itive, fiscal policy still would have no distortionary effects in this model. The reason, as
it will become clear later, is that in competitive labor markets individuals would have no
10In equation (2) below, the capital stock that appears in the labor demand function is equal to
the endowment of capital K; thus, this expression assumes that capital is immobile. In section 4, the
problem of the union will be modified to take into account capital mobility.
11In solving the model, I impose the restriction that s must be strictly less than the wage (it is clear
that s cannot be higher than the wage, because nobody would want to work at a wage lower than
the unemployment subsidy). Because this assumption implies that full employment always prevails in
country B, it helps simplify the exposition considerably but in no way does it reduce the generality of
the analysis. Indeed, it is possible to prove all the results of this model when s is not restricted to be
less than the wage, at the cost of a significant lengthening of the analysis and without any gain in terms
of intuition. Furthermore, this assumption is no longer required when capital is mobile, since in this
case the wage is always strictly higher than s in both countries.
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incentive to create unemployment by voting for a positive tax rate and therefore a pos-
itive subsidization of unemployment. By contrast, a union with some monopoly power
can exploit redistributive fiscal policy as a leverage in setting the wage. Assumption 3,
the difference in the administrative standards of redistributive policy, then means that
in country A the union has access to an alternative income for unemployed workers, and
therefore might use it as a leverage to create and finance unemployment.
B. Discussion of the assumptions.
Before turning to the solution of the model, four assumptions deserve some discus-
sion. First, the program is financed by a proportional tax on capital income. This makes
the analysis easier and the exposition more intuitive. However, one could relax this re-
striction and allow for taxation of labor income in at least two ways. One could assume
that the distribution of labor endowments among workers has some dispersion. If the
distribution of endowments is sufficiently skewed to the right (the empirically relevant
case), a majority of workers could still vote for a positive tax rate even if it falls on
labor too. Alternatively, one could assume, realistically, that the tax rate is progressive.
12
 Although conceptually both extensions would be rather straightforward, they would
make the solution of the model much more cumbersome, without adding any substantial
insight to the main argument.
Second, the wage is set by a monopoly union. An alternative way to depart from
the assumption of perfectly competitive labor markets is that the wage (and perhaps
employment) is set by bargaining. As it is well known the outcome of bargaining is
efficient, while this is not the case with a monopoly union. Bargaining too could be
easily incorporated into the model, but again nothing would change in the basic message
of the paper. With a monopoly union, redistribution increases the alternative income for
unemployed workers. With bargaining, redistribution would increase the threat point of
the union; in both cases, the result is a higher wage. In fact, the source of the result of
the present model is not that the union chooses an inefficient outcome given the tax rate
t, rather, that voters choose a too high t given the outcome of the wage negotiations.
Third, labor is immobile. Again, this assumption is made only for simplicity: in fact,
in this model labor mobility would not make any difference. By definition, a monopoly
union can set the wage and therefore employment in its country; thus, any worker who
wanted to move from the other country would not be able to be employed, and at most
12In this case the degree of progressivity would have to be determined outside the model, since, as
it is well known, it is difficult to establish the existence of a non-cycling majority when the tax rate is
not proportional.
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he would be able to collect a pension; but since in equilibrium the pension is always less
than the full employment wage, no worker will ever want to do that. 13
Finally, there is only one fiscal program. Alternatively, one could assume that fiscal
revenues can be used to finance a second program, like an unemployment benefit. The
only complication is that one must also provide a mechanism that governs the allocation
of revenues between the two programs. An example of one such mechanism is bargaining
between the clienteles of the two programs. Provided that country A has looser standards
in administering the unemployment benefit too, the logic of the model would still go
through: indeed, it would still be true that A's monopoly union has more leverage when
setting the wage than B's union.
4 Fiscal policy with immobile capital.
A. Unemployment in the two regimes.
Because it is the most intuitive case, I first analyze the two regimes when capital is
immobile between the two countries. Clearly, in country B the best a union can do is
to employ all its members by setting the wage at its full employment level. In country
A, at an internal solution the optimal wage is a mark-up over the alternative cost of
employment to the union, s:
w = = - (3)
<r — 1 a
where a is the (negative of the) elasticity of the demand for labor to the wage, which
from (2) is equal to j ^ - However, if the wage at full employment is already higher than
the r.h.s. of (3), the union will set the wage at its full employment level. Combining
these results, one obtains that employment in country A is defined by:
w(L) = s/a for s/a > w(L)
L = L for s/a < w(L) (4)
where w(L) = aLa lKl a. Thus, (4) defines employment as a negative function of the
subsidy s. Hence, the larger the revenues available for redistribution, the higher s and
the higher unemployment. In the centralized regime, country A can subsidize unem-
ployment using some fiscal revenues from country B, where there is no unemployment
to subsidize. This provides the basic intuition for the following
13See Epple and Romer (1991) and Wildasin (1991) for analyses of the interaction of labor mobility
with redistributive fiscal policy at the subnational level.
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Proposition 1:
When capital is immobile across countries, there is unemployment in country A in both





The government budget constraint implies the following relationship between 5 and t in
a decentralized regime:
LR + L — L
To understand this expression, note that (1 — a)LaK1~a is total income from capital.
The numerator on the r.h.s. of (5) therefore represents total tax revenues, while the
denominator is the mass of agents who receive the subsidy 5, i.e. the LR retirees plus
the L — L unemployed workers. Together, (4) and (5) determine s and L as functions of
t. The important point about these two functions is that both are monotonic, the first
positive and the second negative. In fact, 5 is an increasing function of t for 5 E [0, | ) ,
and is maximized at t = | . It is then intuitive that as t and therefore 5 increase, the
optimal wage set by the union increases too, since as shown above it is just a mark-up
I/a over the subsidy. As the wage increases, employment decreases. 14
Because full employment always prevails in country B, all one has to do in order to
determine the equilibrium employment and production in this two-country world is to
find the tax rate and therefore the level of employment that prevail by majority voting
in country A.
Consider then how the various agents in country A will vote. It is clear that capitalists
always vote for t = 0, since the burden of the tax falls entirely on capital. As to retirees,
they vote for the tax rate that maximizes the pension, i.e. for t = 1/2. The tax rate
proposed by workers will then be the winning proposal. Because the utility of workers
depends on the tax rate only indirectly, one can think of them as voting on employment,
14This effect operates only after a certain tax rate t. As long as the tax rate is below t, s/a is
smaller than the full employment wage w(L), and the union has no interest in decreasing employment.
Once t exceeds t, however, s/a increases with t above the full employment wage and employment starts
declining as the wage set by the union increases. Thus, dL/dt is 0 for t £ [0,t\, it is negative for
t e (i, 1/2), and it is 0 at t = 1/2.
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L, rather than the tax rate, t. In fact, the two problems are the same because there is a
monotonic relation between the two variables for t E [i, 1/2]. Consider then the utility
of workers at an interior optimum for the union, i.e. where w — s/a, or equivalently
for t >t. Appendix A shows that the objective function of workers is maximized at the
lowest possible L, or equivalently at the highest possible tax rate, t = 1/2.
As the workers' proposal coincides with that of retirees, this is the tax rate that pre-
vails in equilibrium. The corresponding unemployment is the maximum unemployment
that can be financed in country A, given that the tax base is that country's capital
income. In country B, workers are indifferent to any tax rate, since capital is immobile
and the subsidy cannot exceed the full employment wage. Holders of capital vote for
t = 0, while retirees vote for the tax rate that maximizes the pension, t = 1/2. Because
LR > Lx-> t = 1/2 prevails in equilibrium in country B. However, note that here the
tax rate has no distortionary consequences because of the absence of unions and the
assumption of capital immobility.
Thus, in both countries a majority of agents vote for the highest possible tax rate,
and this generates a positive unemployment in country A.
Centralized regime.
The crucial difference between the two regimes is in the expressions for their budget
constraints. In the centralized regime, the relationship between s and t is given by:




 2LR + L-L L
The important point is that (6) is not just a blown-up version of (5). Now for any given
t the tax base and total tax revenues are, roughly speaking, double those of country
A alone; however, these revenues must be divided among less than double the mass of
individuals, since unnmployed workers in country B do not have access to the pension.
Thus, for any given tax rate t more revenues are available to A's union to finance
unemployment. As before, full employment always prevails in country B and in country
A the union still sets the wage exactly as in (4). Thus, it is clear that capitalists in both
countries vote for t = 0. Retirees in both countries vote for t = 1/2, the tax rate that
maximizes the pension. Because workers in country B are indifferent to any tax rate,
workers in A are again the decisive agents.
Again it is useful to cast the problem of workers in A as one of choosing the optimal
employment. Appendix A shows that, as in the decentralized regime, the utility of
workers is maximized at the smallest possible employment that can be financed by the
existing tax base. Given the inverse relation between L and t, this means that workers
in A will vote for t — 1/2, and this is the tax rate that will be adopted in equilibrium.
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Although the equilibrium tax rates in the two regimes are the same, the correspond-
ing levels of output and employment are different. The reason is that a centralized fiscal
policy enables the union in A to use some of the tax revenues collected in B (in excess
of those needed to subsidize B's LR retirees) to subsidize more unemployment than it is
possible to finance in the decentralized regime. 15
C. Discussion.
Proposition 1 essentially states that, when policies are endogenous, centralized redistri-
bution is productive inefficient relative to decentralized redistribution. This conclusion
is similar to that of the public good approach to income redistribution, in the sense that
in both cases a centralized system delivers higher taxation and redistribution. The un-
derlying mechanisms and implications, however, are very different. There, a centralized
system leads to more taxation and redistribution by solving the free-rider problem in
the provision of the public good "welfare of the poor". Here, a centralized system allows
a group of individuals in one country to exploit some available rents by "free-riding"
on the fiscal resources of the other country. The asymmetry in the administration of
the fiscal systems is at the heart of this result. In fact, if countries A and B were ex-
actly symmetrical, i.e. if workers in country B had access to the subsidy or workers in
country A did not have access to the subsidy, then in this model the centralized and
the decentralized regimes would deliver exactly the same tax rates and redistribution
in equilibrium. By contrast, in the public finance approach a centralized regime would
give higher taxation regardless of any difference between the two countries.
It is important to emphasize that the notion of efficiency employed here is one of pro-
ductive efficiency, and it refers exclusively to the allocation of resources in the economy.
In fact, the equilibrium of the economy is always Pareto efficient, since it is a voting
equilibrium and therefore corresponds to the preferred outcome of at least one group of
voters.
5 Fiscal policy with mobile capital.
A. Unemployment in the two regimes.
15Consider again the analogy between the union and a monopolist "selling" the output L facing
a constant marginal (opportunity) cost, s, and a constant elasticity of demand, I/a. Clearly, this
monopolist will react to this increase in the marginal cost by reducing the supply of labor.
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One might object that the result of the previous section is highly dependent on the
assumption of immobile capital. If the problem is that the union in country A uses fiscal
resources to finance unemployment, will capital mobility not take care of it by raising
the elasticity of the demand for labor in country A, thus limiting the ability of the union
to exploit its monopoly power? In fact, a fairly general intuition suggests that capital
mobility has a powerful effect in limiting the size of rents, and therefore the incentives to
appropriate them. This and the next section show that in this model the answer may be
surprisingly different from this first intuition. In particular, this section shows that this
is the case only in a decentralized regime, while in a centralized regime unemployment
might indeed be higher when capital is mobile. Thus, under capital mobility there might
be even stronger efficiency reasons for decentralizing the financing of redistribution.
When capital is mobile, the after-tax marginal returns to capital in the two countries
must be equalized: 16
(1 - i)LaK-a = (1 - tB)La(2K - K)~a (7)
There are two effects of an increase in taxation in A on the flow of capital from A to
B: (i) the direct effect (i.e., at constant employment): when the tax rate in A increases
relative to the tax rate in B, capital flows from A to B to reestablish equality of the
after-tax marginal returns to capital; (ii) the indirect effect the higher tax revenues that
are available to subsidize unemployment induce a decline in employment and an outflow
of capital from A. Because by definition the tax rates in the two countries are the same
in the centralized regime, the direct effect operates only in the decentralized regime,
while the indirect effect operates in both regimes. This implies that the elasticity of
capital outflows to the tax rate is higher in a decentralized regime. Thus, the markup
is now always lower than I /a , although higher in the centralized regime. This provides
the intuition for the next proposition:
Proposition 2:
When capital is mobile across countries:
(i) full employment always prevails in both countries in a decentralized regime;
(ii) there is positive unemployment in A in a centralized regime.
Proof:
See Appendix B.
16The subscript "J5" denotes country B, while as usual all variables without a subscript refer to




In the voting equilibrium, each voter in each country proposes the tax rate that max-
imizes his utility taking as given the tax rate in the other country. Thus, the voting
outcome is a Nash equilibrium between the decisive voters in the two countries.
The equilibrium in country B is easily determined, as both capitalists and workers
vote for IB — 0. Indeed, ts = 0 is a dominant strategy for workers for any given tax rate
in A because it maximizes the outflow of capital from A to B and therefore the wage in
B. Thus, ts = 0 is the equilibrium tax rate in country B.
In country A, as usual capitalists vote for t = 0 and retirees vote for the tax rate
that maximizes the pension, t — 1/2. Once again workers are the decisive voters. As
in the case of immobile capital, it is useful to cast the workers' problem in terms of
voting on employment rather than the tax rate. Now the marginal cost of decreasing
employment is higher than when capital is immobile, because the required increase in
the tax rate causes an outflows of capital for two distinct reasons: the higher tax rate
on capital income (the direct effect of taxation) and the reduction in employment itself
(the indirect effect of taxation). In fact, these two effects combined are so strong that
the marginal cost of reducing employment is always higher than its marginal benefit at
any value of L. Consequently, workers in A vote for full employment, or equivalently for
t = 0. Because this is the tax rate that capitalists too prefer, t = 0 and full employment
are the equilibrium outcomes in A as well.
Centralized regime.
Since only the indirect effects of taxation is present, A's workers now face a lower
marginal cost of decreasing employment than in a decentralized regime. One would then
expect that A's workers will vote for a higher unemployment in a centralized regime.
In fact, A's workers vote for the highest possible unemployment, which is obtained at
t — 1/2. As retirees also vote for t = 1/2 in order to maximize redistribution, this is
the tax rate that will be adopted in the voting equilibrium. Note that, interestingly,
B's workers too vote for t — 1/2. The reason is that, by maximizing the tax rate and
therefore redistribution, B's workers can maximize unemployment in A and therefore the
outflow of capital to B. Because the tax rate resulting from the voting process is now
positive, unemployment in A will be positive too (and actually, the highest possible). As
in the case of immobile capital, then, unemployment is higher in the centralized regime.
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C. Unemployment with mobile and immobile capital.
The result in Proposition 2 - and its underlying logic - is well known from the litera-
ture on fiscal federalism: when the tax base is mobile, taxation is lower in a decentralized
regime. When the distortionary effects of taxation are taken into account, like in this
model, one might be tempted to use the logic that leads to Proposition 2 to infer a
second result, namely that capital mobility also reduces unemployment in a centralized
regime, relative to the case of immobile capital. This argument can be wrong, as shown
in the next proposition:
Proposition 3:
(i) unemployment in the centralized regime can be higher when capital is mobile than
when capital is immobile;
(ii) the difference in the unemployment rates between the two regimes can be higher




The intuition for this result is straightforward. As the previous subsection has shown,
the marginal cost of unemployment to A's workers is always lower than the marginal
benefit in a centralized regime with capital mobility. Hence, A's workers will still try
to generate as much unemployment as possible by voting for the highest possible tax
rate. But when capital is mobile, for any given tax rate and employment in A total tax
revenues are higher than when capital is immobile because the allocation of capital is
more efficient. Intuitively, this means that when capital is mobile the tax base is higher,
and therefore that more unemployment can be subsidized. 17 Note also that not only
unemployment, but even output can be lower in the centralized regime when capital is
mobile. This of course is important since the correct measure of aggregate productive
efficiency in this model is total output, not employment.
17The formal argument is more complex than this. It is true that, for any given unemployment, the
tax base and therefore the subsidy s are higher when capital is mobile; however, the mark-up of the wage
on s is lower because the demand for labor is more elastic. In addition, the wage itself is lower because
of the outflow of capital. As Appendix C shows, the net result of these three effects is that in general
the wage is below the mark-up times the subsidy when all are evaluated at the equilibrium employment




This section delivers two main messages. The first is relatively unsurprising, and
follows almost immediately from the logic of the tax competition argument emphasized
by the public good approach to redistribution: capital mobility reduces distortions in a
decentralized regime. The second message is less obvious: capital mobility per se need
not alleviate the distortions associated with centralized redistribution; in fact, in general
it will exacerbate them.
Table 2 summarizes the main results of the paper so far. Each entry represents
equilibrium unemployment: of course, the numbers in each entry are only meant to
illustrate the ranking of the various cases. 18




At the heart of these results is the notion that capital mobility makes an economy
intrinsically more efficient. Capital mobility is usually assumed to reduce the monopoly
power of a labor union by increasing the elasticity of the demand for labor it faces,
thus inducing it to provide more employment. This effect is at work in this model.
However, a second effect is also at work. Because the economy is more efficient when
capital is mobile, for any given t and L tax revenues are higher; therefore, the marginal
(opportunity) cost of employment to the union - the subsidy 5 - is higher, inducing the
union to provide less employment. When the endogeneity of the tax rate is taken into
account, the second effect prevails.
Notice that all one needs for the standard tax competition argument is the mobility
of the tax base: for this, an economy with even one factor will do. To obtain the result
of Proposition 3, one needs a richer model of the economy, where two factors can be





18The exception is the case of decentralized fiscal policy with capital mobility, where unemployment
is actually 0.
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taxation on aggregate labor supply.
6 Endogenous fiscal regimes.
A. Voting on the fiscal regime.
Propositions 2 and 3 would still be of limited significance if the political process took
care of the inefficiency of the centralized regime. After all, not only is a centralized
regime always more inefficient than the decentralized regime: it also entails a net flow of
resources from country B to country A. It is then difficult to see why country B should
participate in a centralized system of redistribution. Hence, once the choice of the regime
too is endogenized, a decentralized regime should prevail; in the more relevant case of
capital mobility, this would indeed take away all monopoly power from the union and
both economies would be undistorted.
As it turns out, this intuition is wrong. Suppose that a centralized regime requires
the approval of a majority of agents in each country to be implemented: that is, a coun-
try can opt out of the arrangement if a majority of its residents are against it, in which
case fiscal policies in both countries will be decentralized. The following proposition
summarizes the outcomes of this voting process:
Proposition 4:
Suppose that all agents in both countries vote over the choice of the fiscal regime, and
that a centralized regime requires a majority of votes in each country. Then:
(i) when capital is mobile, centralized redistribution is adopted;
(ii) when capital is immobile, decentralized redistribution is adopted.
Proof:
The proof is immediate by comparing the utilities of each type of agent and in the two
countries in the two regimes. Sub-section B below provides such a comparison in the
context of a more intuitive proof of the proposition.
Thus, voters in both countries prefer the centralized regime exactly when it is most inef-
ficient, i.e. when capital is mobile.
B. Intuition.
Clearly, in country A workers and retirees are better off in a centralized regime.
In fact, workers could always reproduce the outcome of the decentralized regime by
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voting for t = 0. If they choose not to do so, it must be the case that they are better
off in the equilibrium of the centralized regime. Retirees are also better off in the
centralized regime, because they get a positive pension as opposed to no pension at all
in the decentralized regime. Hence, a majority of agents in country A will vote for a
centralized regime.
Workers in country B also prefer the centralized regime, since B's capital stock is
higher and so is their wage. Retirees too vote for the centralized regime for exactly the
same reasons why A's retirees vote for it. Hence, in both countries a majority coalition
of workers and retirees votes for centralized redistribution, at the expense of a minority
of capitalists.
By contrast, when capital is immobile centralized redistribution would not gather
enough consensus in country B. The reason is that now B's retirees are better off in
a decentralized regime because they do not have to share their country's tax revenues
with A's workers and retirees.
C. Discussion.
Proposition 3 and 4 together imply that, contrary to intuition, capital mobility will
not take care of the inefficiencies associated with redistribution, quite the contrary. Not
only does capital mobility exacerbate the relative (to the decentralized regime) and
absolute inefficiency of the centralized regime (Proposition 3), but also it causes a shift
in the preferences of the decisive agents and induces a majority of voters in both countries
to vote for the more inefficient regime (Proposition 4.)
The crucial intuition behind this proposition is that capital mobility, while (indeed,
exactly because) it hurts workers in country A, benefits workers and retirees in country
B, by inducing a flow of capital to country B.
Thus, the four propositions of the paper provide a clear answer to the two questions
that motivated the analysis: when countries (or regions within a country) differ substan-
tially in their attitudes towards redistribution, for political or administrative reasons,
then: (i) a system of centralized redistribution leads to a more inefficient allocation of
resources; (ii) when both fiscal policies and fiscal regimes are allowed to be endogenous,
capital mobility will not mitigate the problem inherent in centralized redistribution,
rather, it will exacerbate it.
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7 Extensions and conclusions.
The paper has focused on the consequences of an important type of institutional dif-
ference between countries joining a union or between regions within a country, namely,
administrative standards and more generally collective attitudes towards social security
programs. However, the basic framework can be extended to other, equally relevant
institutional differences.
Suppose that the two countries differ in the structure of their labor markets: in the
first country, the labor market is unionized, while in the second it is perfectly compet-
itive. Hence, in the second country full employment always prevails, while in the first
the union can use the fiscal system as a leverage, according to the usual mechanism. It
is clear that from now on the analysis is formally identical to that of the present model,
and all the results proved in this paper hold within this framework too. Differences in
the degree of unionization of labor markets and in the power of labor unions do ap-
pear to be empirically important: among others, Calmfors and Drifill (1988) document
important differences along this dimension among 17 OECD countries.
Similarly, the model of this paper could be easily extended to incorporate differences
in tax, as opposed to expenditure, administration. Suppose in the first country taxes
are evaded much more easily than in the second; then the marginal cost of redistribution
in a centralized regime is lower in the first country, since it is mainly financed by tax
revenues from the second country. Hence, the centralized regime allows one country to
"free-ride" on the tax revenues of the other country, and again the same basic model
developed in this paper can be used to study this case. Alesina and Mare (1994) show
that there is extensive variation in the degree of tax evasion among European countries.
In all these cases, a major message of this paper is that a process of fiscal integration
may lead to "bad" outcomes when it involves countries with very different institutional
characteristics. Recently, other papers have focused the attention on several neglected
advantages of decentralization in fiscal policy. Interestingly, these new arguments in
favor of decentralization invest all three classical branches of fiscal policy: redistribution,
provision of public goods, and stabilization policy.
Regarding redistribution, Alesina and Perotti (1994) address the issue of the insur-
ance properties of a centralized fiscal regime. A longstanding argument in favor of fiscal
centralization is that a centralized system that redistributes income among individuals
automatically insures countries (or regions) against country- or region-specific shocks,
because it indirectly redistributes income from the country hit by a positive shock to
the country hit by a negative shock. Persson and Tabellini (1992) compare the proper-
ties of this system to those of a direct system of transfers among countries, and Sachs
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and Sal a-1-Mart in (1992) show that this mechanism might be potentially relevant in the
United States. Alesina and Perotti (1994) show that, when countries are characterized
by highly polarized income distributions and the tax rate are determined endogenously
by majority voting, a centralized regime, while reducing the variability of the tax bases,
might increase the variability of the tax rate. Consequently, disposable incomes might
become more, rather then less, variable, and welfare might fall for a majority of agents
in all countries involved. The basic intuition is that in a centralized regime individuals
from more countries, and therefore with more diverse preferences, participate in the
decision over the tax rate.
A second longstanding argument in favor of centralization is that it helps overcome
problems of economies of scale in the provision of public goods. Yet, when countries
have different preferences about the types of public goods, these economies of scale must
be weighed against a loss of specificity in the provision of the public good. Alesina and
Spolaore (1994) study this trade-off between economies of scale and specificity and show
that, when differences in preferences among countries are sufficiently strong, there will
be more countries than it is socially optimal.
Finally, Gramlich (1987) has questioned the commonly held view that stabilization
policies should be the exclusive domain of central governments, on the ground that
central governments operate under flexible exchange rates and subnational governments
under fixed exchange rates, and demand shocks can be inversely correlated across regions
of a country.
All these arguments in favor of decentralization must be weighed against the merits of
centralization advocated by a long tradition in public finance, which still retain all their
validity. Ultimately, the choice between the two systems has to be made on empirical




This Appendix shows that when capital is immobile a positive unemployment is possible
only if a is smaller than a certain value a0.
At an internal optimum for the union, w(L) = s(t, L)/a. Because w is a decreasing
function of Z, while s is an increasing function of both L and t for t E [0,1/2), a necessary
condition for an internal optimum is s(l/2,L)/a > w(L). Using the government budget
constraint to express s as a function of t and Z, this condition becomes:
-ilO- (A.I)
This gives:
a < = a0 (A.2)
where IR = LR/L. TO gather some idea on the size of a0, notice that a0 tends to 1 as
IR tends to 0, it is exactly .5 when IR = .5 and it is about .62 for IR = .25.
It is also easy to show that the same condition on a is necessary for a positive level
of unemployment to be possible in a centralized regime. A similar procedure can also be
followed to show that a < a\ is a necessary condition for unemployment to be possible




This section proves the two parts of Proposition 2.
(i) In this part, I prove that when capital is mobile there is no unemployment in
either country in a decentralized regime. Because the result is rather intuitive in the
case of country B, I focus only on the determination of the equilibrium in country A.
Consider the problem of workers first. At an internal optimum for the union
Using the government budget constraint
(t-t2)(l-a)LaKl-a
s =
LR + L - L
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(B.I) can be rewritten as:
H = a(aL + le)(LR + L - L) - (t - t2)(l - a)L(L + LO) = 0 (B.4)
Equation (B.4) defines the implicit relation between L and t at an internal optimum for
the union. Now consider the derivative of H with respect to L:
BH
— = a\LR + L-L)- a(aL + LO) - (t - t2)(l - a)(2L + LO) (B.5)
ULJ
Using (B.4), (B.5) can be shown to be always strictly negative V£ £ [0, |] and VX £
[0, L]. Then, because both dH/dL and dH/dt are continuous, (B.4) defines a continuous
function L = (f>(t) whose derivatives too are continuous (see Figure 1).
The function (/> describes the employment chosen by the union for any given tax rate
t. The existence of this function implies that there is only one L corresponding to any
given t, but so far there is no guarantee that there is only one t corresponding to any
given L. However, it should be obvious that workers will never propose a tax rate t that
induces the same level of employment L as a lower tax rate. Thus, all the tax rates in
the intervals (t2,t3] and (t4,t5] in Figure 1 are clearly dominated by some lower tax rate.
Moreover, it is straightforward to show that there are no flat segments in Figure 1, i.e.
that the derivative of <f>(t) is zero at most in isolated values of t. Effectively, then, (B.4)
also defines t as a function of L, t — ip(L). Moreover, this function is monotonically
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decreasing, although in general it is not continuous (see Figure 2). Note also that,
because dH/dL is never 0, dt/dL is always strictly negative.
The next step consists in showing that, whenever dt/dL is negative, the derivative
of the workers' objective function with respect to L is positive. In fact, using (B.I) one
can write this objective function as:
(B.6)
L + L9 v
Using (B.3) and the expression for the wage w = aL1~aK1~a, one obtains
log V = {a- 2)log (L + LO) + log [(1 - a)L2 + L{aL + OL)] (B.7)
Differentiating with respect to log L, after some algebraic passages one obtains:
{ { 1 ~ a)L(L " L) \261 + aL}} (R8)
where P = L + OL, Q = (1 - a)L2 + L(aL + OL) and (3 is the elasticity of 6 to L:
_ dlog 6 dlog 6 dlog t I t dlog t
dlog L dlog t dlog L al — t dlog L
dlog 11 dlog 9 can be determined by implicit differentiation of the condition for an opti-
mum for the union (B.4):
dlogt _ a2(LR + L-L)- a(aL + OL) - (t - t2)(l - a)(2L + OL) L
dlog L~ _(i _ 2t)(l - a)L(L + 0L) + L [a(LR + L - L) - {t - t2){\ - a)L] f ~i
(B.10)
Because dt/dL is always negative, (3 is always negative too. Hence, since the numer-
ator of (B.10) is always negative, the denominator must be negative as well. Using
(B.4) it is easy to show that the numerator of (B.10) is larger, in absolute value, than
L \a(aL + OL) + (t — t2)(l — OL)L\. AS to the denominator, note that the term in brack-
ets is always positive: in fact, using (B.4), one can rewrite this term as (1 — a)2L2(t —
t2)/(aL + OL). Therefore, in absolute value dlog t/dlog L is larger than:
(dlogt\ L [a(aL + OL) + (t - «»)(! - a)b\
{dlog L) - i(l - 2<)(1 - a)L(L + 0L) ^ '
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and using the definition of (3 in (B.9) one can bound the absolute value of /? from below:
c(aL + BL) + (t - f2)(l - a)L
a(l - a)(L + 91) (
But from (B.4) (t - <2)(1 - a)L = [a(aL + 0L)(LR + L - £)] / [L + 0l\, so that
and therefore
Now let Mo be the term in braces in (B.14), multiplied by (L + OL)2. Since ts = 0,
9 > 1; hence, (aL + 6>Z)(1 + 6>) > aL + 26>X and
Mo > Mi = 6>Z2 [Z2(2 - a) - XZ(1 - a) + ^Z2] - (1 - a)L(L - L)(L + 6>Z)2 (B.15)
It is easy to show that Mi is a convex function of 9. Because its derivative, evaluated at
0 = 1 is positive, Mi is a positive function of 0 and therefore it is minimized at 6 = 1.
Similarly, it is easy to show that, for any given 0, the derivative of M1 with respect to
a is also positive. Thus,
M1>M2= L2 [2L2 -LL + Z2] - L(L - L)(L + Z)2 (B.16)
It is relatively straightforward to show that M2 > L2(L — L)2, which is clearly always
non-negative. Because dlog V/dlog L > M2, this establishes that the objective function
of workers is always increasing in L at internal optima for the union.
But then consider any L £ [0,I/4] in Figure 2 that are internal optima for the union.
As L increases in this interval the workers' objective function V increases. At L4, the
function t = i/>(L) is discontinuous; however, it is clear that L4 strictly dominates any
other point in the interval [0,2/4] because t\ < t5. Correspondingly, t4 maximizes V in
the interval [t4, | ] , Similarly, it is clear that L\ and t\ maximize V in the intervals [0,Xi]
and [ti, | ] respectively. Proceeding this way, it is clear that workers will always vote for
t = 0 or, equivalently, full employment.
As usual, capitalists also vote for t = 0, while retirees vote for the strictly positive
tax rate that maximizes s. Thus, a majority composed of capitalists and workers vote
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for t = 0, and as a result full employment always prevails in equilibrium in country A
as well.
(ii) To prove that unemployment in A is positive in the centralized regime, note that
the problem of A's workers in the centralized regime is the same as in the decentralized
regime, except that now 9 = 1 identically and consequently f3 = 0 always. From (B.8),
it follows that dlog V/dlog L is always negative. In addition, from (B.10) dlog L/dlog t
is always negative too, so that the utility of A's workers is maximized when t = 1/2
and unemployment reaches he maximum. Because retirees in both countries also vote
for t = 1/2, this is the tax rate that prevails in the voting process. As a result, the
equilibrium unemployment in A is the highest that can be subsidized.
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Appendix C.
This Appendix shows that unemployment in a centralized regime may be larger when
capital is mobile than when capital is immobile.
Assume initially that at the tax rate t = 1/2 the subsidy s when capital is immobile
is lower than the full employment wage. Then the equilibrium condition that determines
employment when capital is immobile is:
4a(2lR + L-L) = L(l-a)(l + ^ \ (C.I)
When capital is mobile, the same equilibrium condition has the form:
l £±^ (C.2)
The l.h.s. is the same decreasing function of L in both (C.I) and (C.2). In both
expressions, the r.h.s. is increasing in L, and moreover the r.h.s. of (C.2) can be easily
shown to be always above the r.h.s. of (C.I). In fact, the former is strictly greater
than (1 — ot)(L + X), which is not smaller than the latter for L E [0,Z), Consequently,
equilibrium employment is lower when capital is mobile (see Figure 3). Notice however
that it does not necessarily follow that the combined production of the two countries is
lower, because capital is utilized more efficiently when capital is mobile.
However, the discussion so far has assumed that the equilibrium subsidy common
to both countries is below the full employment wage when capital is immobile. If this
is not the case, the tax revenues collected in B in excess of those needed to pay the
full employment wage to all retirees in B can be used to finance redistribution in A. In
this case, the l.h.s. of the equilibrium condition (C.I) is smaller than that of (C.2) and
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